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Abstract
This paper shows that, contrary to what is generally believed, decreas-
ing concavity of the agent’s utility function with respect to the screening
variable is not sufficient to ensure that stochastic mechanisms are subopti-
mal. The paper demonstrates, however, that they are suboptimal whenever
the optimal deterministic mechanism exhibits no bunching. This is the case
for most applications of the theory and therefore validates the literature’s
usual focus on deterministic mechanisms.
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1 Introduction
In the past decades economic literature has seen many fruitful applications of
mechanism design in the theory of nonlinear pricing, monopoly regulation, tax-
ation, and insurance. Most of these applications, however, restrict their analysis
to deterministic mechanisms. By itself the restriction is problematic, because
it is well known that in general deterministic mechanisms are suboptimal (e.g.
Stiglitz [6], Arnott and Stiglitz [1]). It is therefore a priori not clear that the
obtained mechanisms are truly optimal and do indeed represent optimal ways to
deal with asymmetric information.1 This has prompted authors to find additional
conditions that guarantee an optimality of deterministic mechanisms.
For principal–agent problems with quasi–linear utility such a condition is seen
in a decreasing concavity of the agent’s utility function with respect to the screen-
ing variable (e.g., Laffont and Tirole [4,p.119], or Fudenberg and Tirole [2,p.306],
Laffont and Martimort [3,p.65]). This paper presents a counter example which
contradicts this claim. It provides the intuition that, contrary to deterministic
mechanisms, stochastic mechanisms are able to implement allocations that are
non–monotonic in expected terms. Consequently, stochastic mechanisms may be
optimal when non–monotonic schemes are desirable.
The paper further shows that when the optimal deterministic mechanism does
not involve bunching, then it is also optimal with respect to stochastic mecha-
nisms. As “no–bunching” is the norm in most applications of the theory, the result
validates the literature’s focus on deterministic mechanisms.2 I demonstrate this
result by considering the optimality of stochastic mechanisms directly. The ap-
proach therefore differs from the literature’s more indirect procedure of replacing
each random mechanism with a corresponding deterministic one. Instead, my
approach is more related to Myerson [5], who shows that also in auctions the im-
plementation problem can be reduced to an unconstrained maximization problem
which is linear in probability.
2 The Example
An existing argument that demonstrates the suboptimality of random mech-
anisms in principal–agent settings with quasi–linear utilities may be found in
standard text books (e.g., [2,p.306], [4,p.119], [3,p.65])). The logic behind the ar-
1See [6] for a more elaborate discussion of this problem.
2Hence, apart from the fact that the analysis of bunching is more involved, an additional
reason to focus on settings without bunching is the optimality of deterministic mechanisms.
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gument is to show that the players gain by replacing a random mechanism with
one that implements the expected allocation of the mechanism deterministically.
Indeed, if this can be done for any random mechanism, then random mechanisms
are suboptimal. However, contrary to deterministic mechanisms, random mech-
anisms are able to implement allocations that are non–monotonic in expected
terms. As is well known, such schedules cannot be implemented by deterministic
mechanisms.
This suggests that if non–monotonic schedules are desirable, stochastic mech-
anisms may outperform deterministic ones. In this case, the principal faces a
trade–off between the desirability of non–monotonic schedules versus the intro-
duction of additional risk. Consequently, this section demonstrates the beneficial
role of stochastic mechanisms in a specific principal agent problem in which the
principal and the efficient type do not mind risky allocations. It therefore illus-
trates the positive effect of stochastic mechanisms in an extreme way; stochas-
tic mechanisms are able to implement the optimal non–monotonic deterministic
mechanism arbitrarily closely.
Suppose the principal has to implement some allocation x ∈ IR+ and may
specify a transfer w ∈ IR. There are two types of agents θ ∈ {1, 2} with quasi–
linear utility functions
u1(w, x) = w − x2 and u2(w, x) =
{
w − x2/2 for x < 2;
w − 2x+ 2 for x ≥ 2.
Note that the utility function of type 2 is differentiable at x = 2 and satisfies the
single crossing condition ∂u1(w, x)/∂x ≤ ∂u2(w, x)/∂x for all (w, x). The specific
feature of type 2’s utility function is that it does not exhibit any risk aversion
for allocations x ≥ 2. Observe however that his utility function is less concave
with respect to x than type 1’s; a property that a part of the literature views as
a guarantee for the optimality of deterministic mechanisms.
Let the principal consider the two types of agents equally likely. The princi-
pal’s utility associated with an allocation (w, x) depends on the agent’s type as
follows
V1(w, x) = 10x− w; V2(w, x) = x− w.
The first best allocations, which maximize Vi(w, x) + Ui(w, x), are x
fb
1 = 5
and xfb2 = 1. Thus, a decreasing schedule is socially desirable. Under asymmetric
information the optimal direct, deterministic mechanism ((wsb1 , x
sb
1 ), (w
sb
2 , x
sb
2 )) is
a solution to
max V1(w1, x1)/2 + V2(w2, x2)/2
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s.t. U1(w1, x1) ≥ U1(w2, x2) and U2(w2, x2) ≥ U2(w1, x1); (1)
U1(w1, x1) ≥ 0 and U2(w2, x2) ≥ 0; (2)
where (1) represents the incentive constraints and (2) the individual rationality
constraints. Following standard procedure, we first neglect the individual ra-
tionality constraint of the efficient type 2 and the incentive constraint of the
inefficient type 1. This procedure yields the schedule xˆ = (xˆ1, xˆ2) = (3, 1)
with wages wˆ = (wˆ1, wˆ2) = (9, 11/2). However, from the two incentive con-
straints and the single crossing property it follows that a deterministic schedule
is only implementable if it is weakly increasing. Hence, the obtained schedule is
not implementable; the solution (xˆ, wˆ) violates the incentive constraint of type
1. Consequently, the optimal deterministic mechanism involves bunching, i.e.,
x1 = x2 = x, and maximizes V1(w, x)/2 + V2(w, x)/2 subject to U1(w, x) ≥ 0.
Straightforward calculations yield the solution (w∗, x∗) ≡ (121/16, 11/4). It fol-
lows that the optimal deterministic mechanism is (wsb1 , x
sb
1 ) = (w
sb
2 , x
sb
2 ) = (w
∗, x∗)
and yields the principal a payoff of 121/16.
Note that the second best allocation xsb2 = 11/4 lies in the range for which
type 2 is risk neutral with respect to the allocation x. That is, within this
range type 2 is only interested in the expected allocation and is not affected by
randomness. Since also the principal is only interested in the expected allocation,
we can introduce some randomness at no costs. Yet, by introducing randomness
concerning type 2’s allocation, it becomes less attractive to type 1. Randomness
may therefore be introduced to relax the incentive constraint for type 1. As
a concrete example consider the following stochastic direct mechanism. Type
1 is offered the original contract (121/16, 11/4). Type 2 is offered a contract
with a deterministic wage 119/16 but after acceptance the contract randomizes
between the allocations x = 2 and x = 10/3 with equal probability. Note that the
expected allocation 1/2 ∗ 2+1/2 ∗ 10/3 is smaller than the allocation 11/4 which
is meant for type 1. Straightforward calculations show that, despite this feature,
the stochastic mechanism is both individual rational and incentive compatible. It
yields the principal an expected payoff of 91/12, which exceeds the payoff 121/16
from the optimal deterministic contract.
However, in this extreme example where type 2 is risk neutral for any x > 2,
the principal may do even better and implement the decreasing schedule xˆ = (3, 1)
with wages wˆ arbitrarily closely. To see this, consider the deterministic contract
γ1 = (w1, x1) = (9, 3) and a contract γ2(α) with a deterministic wage w2(α) =
5 + α/2 +
√
2(1− α)(8 + α) that randomizes between the allocation x21 = 1 and
x22(α) = 1 +
√
8 + α/
√
2− 2α with probability α and 1 − α respectively. By
4
construction the menu (γ1, γ2(α)) is individual rational and incentive compatible
for any α ∈ (0, 1). Note that as α goes to one, the mechanism implements (xˆ, wˆ)
ever more closely.
The example shows that the optimality of stochastic mechanisms is related
to a desirability of non–monotonic allocation schedules. One may provide the
following intuition for this result: When the principal prefers a non–monotonic
schedule, a separation of types on the basis of different degrees of efficiency is
not appropriate, since such separation demands that schedules are monotonic.
In contrast, non–monotonic separation is possible on the basis of different risk
attitudes by choosing a schedule of increasing risks for the less risk averse types.
Hence, the example suggests that deterministic mechanisms are optimal if non–
monotonic schedules are undesirable. The rest of the paper shows that this rea-
soning is correct; whenever the optimal deterministic mechanism does not involve
bunching, stochastic mechanisms are indeed suboptimal.
3 A General Principal–Agent Setup
Consider a contracting problem between a principal and an agent. The principal
has no private information. The agent, however, is privately informed about his
type θi ∈ Θ, where the number of types n ≡ |Θ| is finite.3 The agent’s type
θ is drawn from some objective distribution p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn). The principal’s
problem consists of selecting a monetary transfer t ∈ IR to the agent and an
allocation x ∈ X ⊂ IR. The principal’s and agent’s payoffs are quasi–linear and
satisfy
V (t, x|θi) = vi(x)− t and U(t, x|θi) = ui(x) + t,
respectively. I make three assumptions concerning the agent’s utility that are
standard for these types of principal–agent problems: First, higher types derive
a higher utility from an allocation x than lower types. I.e.,
ui(x) > ui−1(x), ∀θi ∈ Θ\{θ1}, ∀x ∈ X. (3)
Second, the agent’s preferences satisfy a single crossing condition in that for all
x, y ∈ X with x > y it holds
ui(x)− ui(y) ≥ ui−1(x)− ui−1(y), ∀θi ∈ Θ\{θ1}. (4)
Third, the agent’s reservation utility is type independent and normalized to zero.
3To limit technicalities, I restrict attention to finite, but arbitrarily large type sets.
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In order to solve her contracting problem, the principal may use a mechanism
to elicit the private information from the agent. I distinguish between two types
of mechanisms: deterministic and stochastic ones. For deterministic mechanisms,
the implemented allocation x ∈ X depends on the agent’s supply of information
in a deterministic way, whereas for stochastic mechanisms the relationship may
be stochastic. As is well know (e.g., [2,p.306]), the quasi–linear payoff struc-
ture implies that there is no gain in randomizing with respect to the transfer t.
Consequently, without loss of generality the transfer is assumed deterministic.4
More precisely, a deterministic, direct mechanism ∆ = (t, x) specifies a trans-
fer schedule t : Θ→ IR and an implementation function x : Θ→ X. Thus, when
the agent announces he is of type θi, he receives a transfer ti and the deterministic
allocation xi is implemented.
In order to introduce stochastic mechanisms, let X denote the Borel σ-algebra
on X.5 A stochastic, direct mechanism Σ = (t, µ) specifies a transfer schedule
t : Θ → IR and an implementation function µ : Θ → Q, where Q is the set of
probability measures on X . Thus, µi(H) with H ∈ X denotes the probability
that an allocation which lies in H is implemented, when the agent reports he is of
type θi. Deterministic mechanisms are a special case of stochastic mechanisms.
In particular, a deterministic mechanism ∆ = (t, x) is equivalent to the stochastic
mechanism Σ∆ = (t, µ∆) with
µ∆i (x(θi)) = 1, ∀θi ∈ Θ.
Alternatively, a stochastic mechanism (t, µ) is equivalent to a deterministic mech-
anism, whenever it is degenerated. That is, whenever it holds
µi(H) ∈ {0, 1}, ∀H ∈ X . (5)
4 Two Optimization Problems
Since the principal operates under perfect commitment, the revelation principle
holds. Consequently, there is no loss of generality by focusing on direct mech-
anisms Σ that are incentive compatible. The following maximization problem
yields such an optimal mechanism:
PΣ : max
Σ=(t,µ)
Vσ(Σ) ≡
n∑
i
{∫
pivi(x)dµi − piti
}
(6)
4When also the screening variable enters only linearly, deterministic mechanisms are optimal
by the same argument.
5All functions, such as v and u, are therefore assumed measurable on (X,X ).
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s.t.
∫
ui(x)dµi + ti ≥
∫
ui(x)dµj + tj, ∀θi, θj ∈ Θ; (7)∫
ui(x)dµi + ti ≥ 0, ∀θi ∈ Θ; (8)
where (7) represent the incentive compatibility constraints and (8) the individual
rationality constraints. Let Σ∗ = (tΣ, µΣ) with value V Σ = Vσ(Σ∗) denote a solu-
tion to problem PΣ. Throughout this paper I assume that optimal mechanisms
exist. Clearly, V Σ is unique, while there may be multiple solutions Σ∗.
Most applications of mechanism design do not study problem PΣ directly.
Rather, they first restrict attention to deterministic mechanisms of the type ∆.
In a second step, they then search for conditions that imply a suboptimality of
stochastic mechanisms. Indeed, given a suboptimality of stochastic mechanisms,
the revelation principle indirectly implies that there exists an optimal mecha-
nism that is direct, deterministic, and incentive compatible. Hence, an optimal
deterministic mechanism is a solution to
P∆ : max
∆=(t,x)
Vδ(∆) ≡
∑
i
pi {vi(xi)− ti} (9)
s.t. ui(xi) + ti ≥ ui(xj) + tj, ∀θi, θj ∈ Θ; (10)
ui(xi) + ti ≥ 0, ∀θi ∈ Θ; (11)
where (10) and (11) represent the incentive compatibility and individual rational-
ity constraints, respectively. Let ∆∗ = (t∆, µ∆) with value V ∆ = V (∆∗) denote
a solution to problem P∆.
Since deterministic mechanisms are degenerated stochastic mechanisms, prob-
lem P∆ is more constrained than problem PΣ. More precisely, problem P∆ is
equivalent to PΣ with the additional restriction (5) so that V ∆ ≤ V Σ.
The usual approach to solving problem P∆ is to focus on the local downward
constraints. In particular, disregarding the other constraints, one concentrates
on the relaxed maximization problem:
max
∆=(t,x)
Vδ(∆) s.t. ui(xi) + ti ≥ ui(xi−1) + ti−1, ∀θi ∈ Θ, (12)
where u1(x0) = t0 = 0. As is well known, the single crossing condition implies
that a solution to the relaxed problem (12) coincides with the solution to problem
P∆ if it satisfies the following monotonicity conditions:
xi ≥ xi−1, ∀θi ∈ Θ\{θ1}. (13)
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5 Optimality of Deterministic Mechanisms
This section demonstrates that whenever a solution to (12) exists that satisfies
the monotonicity constraint (13), then this implies that deterministic mechanisms
are optimal. To arrive at this result, I first relax problem PΣ in a similar way as
in the deterministic problem and focus on the relaxed problem
max
Σ=(t,µ)
Vσ(Σ) s.t.
∫
ui(x)dµi + ti ≥
∫
ui(x)dµi−1 + ti−1, ∀θi ∈ Θ, (14)
where t0 = 0 and µ0(H) = 0 for all H ∈ X . Since problem (14) is less con-
strained than the original problem PΣ, its solution, V r, is weakly greater than
V Σ. In addition, the problem is also less constrained than the relaxed determin-
istic program (12). Indeed, program (12) is equivalent to program (14) with the
additional constraint (5).6
Clearly the constraints in program (14) must be binding at the optimum, since
otherwise one could lower the respective payment ti and increase the objective
function without violating any constraints. Hence, the transfers ti may be solved
recursively as
ti = t
r
i (µ) ≡ −
i∑
j=1
{∫
uj(x)dµj −
∫
uj(x)dµj−1
}
.
Substitution of ti and a rearrangement of terms leads to the maximization problem
max
µ
Vσ(t
r
i (µ), µ) =
n∑
i
{∫
ci(x)dµi
}
, (15)
with
ci(x) ≡ pi(vi(x) + ui(x))−
n∑
j=i+1
pj(ui+1(x)− ui(x)).
A solution of (15) is straightforward.7 For each type θi, it puts all probability
mass on an allocation x that maximizes ci(x). More precisely, define x
r
i as a
maximizer of ci(x), i.e., x
r
i ∈ argmaxx ci(x). Moreover, define µr = (µr1, . . . , µrn)
as
µri (H) ≡
{
1 if xri ∈ H
0 if xri 6∈ H,
for all θi ∈ Θ and H ∈ X .
6Note that there exist no straightforward conditions similar to (13) which guarantee that
the solution of problem (14) coincides with the solution of the original problem (6).
7Existence is guaranteed when X is compact and ci(x) is upper semicontinuous.
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Proposition 1 The implementation function µr is a solution of (15).
Proof: For any implementation function µ˜ it holds
Vσ(t
r
i (µ˜), µ˜) =
n∑
i
pi
{∫
ci(x)dµ˜i
}
≤
n∑
i
pi
{∫
max
x
ci(x)dµ˜i
}
=
n∑
i
pimax
x
ci(x) =
n∑
i
pici(x
r
i ) =
n∑
i
pi
{∫
ci(x)dµ
r
i
}
= Vσ(Σ
r),
with Σr ≡ (tri (µr), µr). Hence, µr yields at least as much as any other µ˜ and is a
maximizer. Q.E.D.
Since µri satisfies (5), it is a degenerated measure. Hence, the mechanism Σ
r =
(tr(µr), µr) is equivalent to the deterministic mechanism ∆r ≡ (tr(µr), xr(θ)) with
xr(θi) ≡ xri .
As ∆r satisfies the constraints of the relaxed maximization problem (12), it must
also solve (12). This reasoning leads to our main result:
Proposition 2 If there exists a solution (t¯, x¯) of (12) that satisfies (13) then
V ∆ = V Σ and deterministic mechanisms are optimal.
Proof: Suppose (t¯, x¯) solves (12) and satisfies (13) then (t¯, x¯) solves P∆ so that
V ∆ = Vδ(t¯, x¯). Thus, it holds Vδ(t¯, x¯) = V
∆ ≤ V Σ ≤ Vσ(Σr). But ∆r satisfies the
constraints in (12) so that it is feasible for this program. Since (t¯, x¯) solves (12),
it must therefore hold Vδ(∆
r) ≤ Vδ(t¯, x¯). Finally we have that Vσ(Σr) = Vδ(∆r).
Linking all these weak inequalities yields Vσ(Σ
r) = Vδ(∆
r) ≤ Vδ(t¯, x¯) = V ∆ ≤
V Σ ≤ Vσ(Σr). Hence, V ∆ = V Σ, so that a deterministic mechanism is optimal.
Q.E.D.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper shows that in principal–agent problems deterministic mechanisms are
suboptimal even if the concavity of the agent’s utility function with respect to the
screening variable decreases with the agent’s type. The advantage of stochastic
mechanisms is that they are able to separate types due to a difference in risk
attitudes with respect to the screening variable instead of efficiency alone. As
a consequence, they are, in contrast to deterministic ones, able to implement
allocations that are decreasing in expected terms. This may render deterministic
mechanisms suboptimal.
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Yet, whenever the optimal deterministic contract involves no bunching of
types, it is also optimal with respect to stochastic mechanisms. This endoge-
nous condition hands applications a practical tool for checking the optimality of
deterministic contracts; normally one already checks for monotonicity for other
reasons. Indeed, since in most applications the obtained optimal deterministic
mechanisms do not involve bunching, it validates the literature’s usual restriction
to such mechanisms.
At first sight it may seem puzzling that the result does not depend on the
concavity of the players’ utility functions vi(x) and ui(x). That is, deterministic
mechanisms are optimal, even when the principal and agent are risk–loving with
respect to x and explicit randomization seems desirable. To understand that such
an intuition is misleading, consider the special case of n = 1. In this case there is
no asymmetric information and the principal simply maximizes the social surplus
v1(x) + u1(x). Clearly, randomization with respect to x does not yield a higher
surplus. In particular, when v1 and u1 are both convex on the entire domain X,
the optimal allocation is either a corner solution or does not exist. Finally, note
that the result does not claim that, in general, there do not exist deterministic
allocations x ∈ X that are Pareto dominated by stochastic ones. Rather, if such
allocations exist, they are suboptimal.
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